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• In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents related, or suspected to be

related, to anti-vehicle mines (AVMs)1 in 24 states and territories, a decrease of
7 per cent compared with 2016. A total of 487 casualties 2 including 321 injured
and 166 killed were recorded from these incidents, an increase of 15 per cent in
comparison with 2016.
• Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali and Iran were the four states with the most recorded AVM

incidents in 2017, followed by Chad, Syria, Western Sahara and Yemen. Since 2015,
Ukraine has been the state with most recorded incidents for three consecutive years,
and Mali has continuously featured among the top three affected states.
• Pakistan, Ukraine, Mali, Chad and Yemen were the states with the highest number

of casualties in 2017. The highest number was recorded in Pakistan with 135 casualties
which accounts for 28 per cent of the global total.
• In 2017, AVM incidents were most lethal when they involved a civilian vehicle.

The lethality ratio, the ratio of those killed to overall casualties, of incidents involving
civilian vehicles reached 40 per cent, while the ratio with overall non-civilian
vehicles amounted to 23 per cent.
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BACKGROUND

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The need for systematic data collection on AVM incidents was first recognised by
the GICHD and SIPRI in a joint study on the humanitarian and developmental impact
of anti-vehicle mines published in October 2014.3 Since 2015, the two organisations
have been collecting global data on AVM incidents with the aim of improving evidence
and identifying trends on the direct humanitarian impact of AVMs. Detailed and
geo-referenced data for each incident are available on interactive and regularly updated
online maps.4
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Background

This report summarises data and analyses of AVM incidents in 2017. It follows up on
similar reports published by the GICHD and SIPRI examining AVM incidents in 2015
and 2016.5 This collection of data over three consecutive years allows for an initial
comparative analysis on and trends of the humanitarian impact of AVMs.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This document draws on field reports provided by states, mainly national mine action
authorities/centres, as well as mine action and other humanitarian organisations. Media
reviews were conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish,
Ukrainian and Urdu to complement the field reports.

FIGURE 1

SOURCES OF INCIDENTS 6

Feedback from

Sources

45

30%

mine action programmes
and organisations

Press articles

70%
Field reports
© GICHD–SIPRI

In 2017, 119 out of 169 recorded incidents (70 per cent) were reported by 45 mine action
programmes and organisations; 50 incidents were recorded from media sources.
Compared with 2015 and 2016, when field reports represented 53 per cent and 44 per
cent of the sample respectively, the stronger reliance on field reports in 2017 suggests
a higher level of data accuracy. A more detailed description of the methodology and
challenges of this research is available in Annex 1.

Background

|

7

GLOBAL TRENDS IN 2017

In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents that were related, or suspected
to be related, to AVMs in 24 states and territories.7 This indicates a slight decrease in
the number of incidents in comparison with both 2015 and 2016, although the scale has
remained fairly stable across the three years (see Figure 2).

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES, 2015–2017

FIGURE 2
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Among all countries where incidents were recorded, the highest number of incidents
in 2017 were found in Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali and Iran. As in 2015 and 2016, Ukraine
was the state where most incidents were recorded with, however, the same number
of incidents as Pakistan in 2017 (31 incidents each).8 In 2017, Russia, Zimbabwe and
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered AVM incidents for the first time since GICHD–SIPRI
data collection began. Prior to this, they had recorded their last AVM incidents in 2009,
2013 and 2014, respectively.9
8
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A total of 487 AVM casualties were recorded in 2017, including 321 injured and 166 killed.
This represents an increase of 15 per cent against 2016 figures.10 Pakistan suffered
the highest numbers of casualties (135), which accounts for 28 per cent of the global
total—a notable increase compared with the previous year.11 While this spike
may be partly explained by strengthened data collection, it is worth noting that a
single incident in 2017 resulted in 27 casualties, after a civilian vehicle drove over a
suspected AVM. This incident resulted in the highest recorded number of casualties
globally that year.12

FIGURE 3

HEAT MAP OF ALL STATES AND TERRITORIES WITH RECORDED
INCIDENTS IN 2017
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Afghanistan 21, Syria 18, Iran 12, Western Sahara 12, Sudan 11, Azerbaijan 10, Egypt 4, Lebanon 4,
Angola 3, Cambodia 3, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1, Morocco 1, Russia 1, South Korea 1, Zimbabwe 1,
Libya 0, South Sudan 0, Tunisia 0
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Initial analysis suggests that the states/territories with higher numbers of AVM casualties
in 2017 tend to have had their last conflict more recently—or may still be in active
conflict.13 At the same time, the long-term impact of AVM contamination is clearly
observable with a number of states/territories still suffering from AVM casualties today,
despite the conclusion of their last conflict dating back years or decades.
Between 2015 and 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 528 AVM incidents that
caused 1,508 casualties. This indicates that 503 people have been killed or injured
from 176 incidents on average every year. This is significantly higher than the average
of 250 AVM casualties from 2012 to 2014 (reported by the Landmine Monitor).14
The highest numbers of casualties recorded by the GICHD and SIPRI between 2015 and
2017 occurred in Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali, Syria and Yemen (see Table 1). These states
alone account for two-thirds of the global three-year total.

TABLE 1

State /
territory

STATES/TERRITORIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES, 2015–2017
Number of
casualties
2015

Number of
casualties
2016

Number of
casualties
2017

Total number
of casualties
2015–2017

Per cent of
global casualties
2015–2017

Ukraine

97

101

74

272

18%

Pakistan

74

52

135

261

17%

Mali

76

55

62

193

13%

Syria

90

38

18

146

10%

Yemen

65

32

42

139

9%

Afghanistan

34

34

21

89

6%

Chad

7

7

47

61

4%

Western Sahara

26

12

12

50

3%

Figure 4 visually depicts the three-year casualty trends by state/territory among those
with the highest number of total casualties during this period. The downward curve
observed in Syria is in stark contrast to the spikes observed in Pakistan and Chad.
Conversely, recorded AVM casualties in Cambodia decreased from 17 in 2015 to 3 in 2017.
This trend follows, albeit slightly delayed, the steady decline in overall mine/explosive
remnants of war (ERW) casualties over the last years: between 2016 and 2017 alone, the
latter dropped by 30 per cent after a 25 per cent decrease the year before.15 As a result,
Cambodia no longer features among the eight states/territories with the highest, threeyear AVM casualty numbers.
10
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FIGURE 4

CASUALTY TRENDS IN STATES/TERRITORIES WITH HIGHEST NUMBERS
OF CASUALTIES, 2015–2017
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BOX 1

CASE STUDY CHAD

Mine and ERW contamination in Chad is essentially the result of the 1973 Libyan
occupation of the Aozou Strip in the north of the country until its ultimate withdrawal
in 1994, as well as of internal conflict.16 Amidst this decades-long conflict, Libyan
forces placed large quantities of both anti-personnel mines (APMs) and AVMs.
The contamination by AVMs still needs to be surveyed further in many areas of the
country, particularly in Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen-Chari and Tibesti 17 regions. According
to records of the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) in 2014, the
Tibesti region accounted for about 64 per cent of Chad’s 103 km² of confirmed
mined area.18 AVM contamination is particularly high in the north of the country.
Clearance operations in the Zouar area in Tibesti region in 2015, for instance, resulted
in almost 1,000 mines being found, 90 per cent of which were AVMs.19 GICHD–SIPRI
data corroborate this finding: all of the AVM incidents recorded from 2015 to 2017,
14 in total, occurred in Tibesti region
FIGURE 5
MAP OF INCIDENTS IN CHAD 20
(see Figure 5).
National data collection in Chad has
traditionally been challenging and
casualty reporting marked by yearly
fluctuations.21 This notwithstanding,
GICHD–SIPRI data indicate that
AVM casualties significantly spiked
in 2017 (see Figure 6) as well as
there being a strong prevalence of
AVM compared with overall mine
casualties. For instance, while
HCND recorded 50 casualties in
2017 from mines overall, 47 resulted
from AVMs alone.22

LIBYA
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To contextualise the sharp increase
in AVM casualties, HCND noted an
“increase of ‘gold dust finder[s]’
(or gold panner[s]) in the north
and an increase of Libyan crossborder traffic.”23 Gold miners represented nearly two-thirds of the total
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FIGURE 6

INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES IN CHAD, 2015–2017
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casualties, which is a notable increase from previous years. Incidents related
to people prospecting for gold are characterised by a particularly high casualty
number (e.g. 15 in 2017) due to the fact that prospectors usually travel in teams of
10–20 workers per vehicle.24 Not surprisingly, civilians accounted for the overwhelming majority of casualties in Chad (see Table 2).
Still amongst the poorest areas of the country, the Tibesti region witnessed a hectic
gold rush from 2013–2015 with an influx of unofficial gold miners from various
Chadian ethnic groups and other countries. This eventually resulted in heightened
competition over the region’s scarce resources, environmental deterioration
and armed clashes between local communities and the miners, coupled with a
reinforcement of security forces. Chad prohibited gold mining activities at the end
of 2013. Whilst the rush lost much of its momentum, gold miners began to return
to the north of the country by mid-2016.25
The high numbers of casualties testify to the considerable human security risk of mine
contamination to civilian communities. In a recent report, the Small Arms Survey and
Conflict Armament Research also point to the need for mine clearance in northern
Chad for regional security, as minefields “can serve as storehouses for mines and
explosives that can be used on other battlefields. […] Between 2005 and 2010 mines
dug up in Tibesti were exported to Libya and even more so to Niger [...].” 26

Global trends
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CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES
From 2015 to 2017, 56 per cent of casualties on average were civilians where disaggregated data were available (see Figure 7). Among the 44 per cent of non-civilian casualties,
national security forces 27 alone accounted for the majority.

CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES, 2015–2017 28
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Figure 8 shows a breakdown of casualties for 2017 alone. That year, the majority (247 out
of 487) of recorded casualties were civilians (including humanitarian personnel)—which
marks a proportional increase compared with the previous year (46 per cent in 2016)—
followed by national security forces (138 out of 487). Other categories of casualties made
up for smaller proportions of this breakdown.29

FIGURE 8

CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES IN 2017

 	51%
Civilians
 	28%
National security forces
 	6%
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 	4%
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Absolute numbers are: civilians 247 (incl. 8 humanitarian personnel),
national security forces 138, peacekeepers 30, other combatants 19,
international security forces 11, unknown 42
© GICHD–SIPRI

CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE
In 2017, sex-disaggregated data were available for 58 per cent of reported AVM casualties
(283 casualties). This is higher than in either 2015 or 2016, possibly due to an increase
in more detailed field reports, as opposed to data from the media. In 2017, following a
pattern observed in previous years, in cases where disaggregated data were available,
nearly all casualties were male. By contrast, women and girls only accounted for
6 per cent (see Figure 9). Apart from one peacekeeper in Ukraine, female casualties
were exclusively civilian.30
Global trends
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Age-disaggregated information was available in 43 per cent of recorded casualties
(210 casualties). 92 per cent of casualties where age was known were adults, whereas
children made up 8 per cent (see Figure 9).31 These figures corroborate trends noted in
previous years.

FIGURE 9

CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE IN 2017
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CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES
Analysing the proportion of incidents triggered by various categories of vehicles, results
show that civilian vehicles and those of national security forces were the categories most
impacted in 2017 (see Figure 10), in line with the trends of previous years.

FIGURE 10

CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES IN 2017
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A civilian vehicle (agricultural, commercial and other civilian) triggered AVMs in 44 per
cent (70 incidents) of recorded incidents involving a vehicle (158 incidents), as opposed
to 49 per cent in 2016 (84 incidents). Among civilian vehicles, a proportional shift can
be noted from agricultural (39 per cent among civilian vehicles in 2016 to 26 per cent
in 2017) to commercial vehicles (10 per cent in 2016 to 18 per cent in 2017).33 Civilian
vehicles are followed by vehicles belonging to national security forces (26 per cent)
and peacekeeping vehicles (8 per cent).34

CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO
AVMs are designed to be triggered by and destroy vehicles and, due to their large
explosive charge, tend to cause several casualties. While the global average of people
killed or injured per AVM incident reached 2.9 in 2017, significant variations can be
observed across states and territories. The average number peaks at 5.22 casualties
per incident in Chad (see Table 2), where three out of nine recorded incidents caused
10, 12 and 18 civilian casualties, respectively. This is a considerably higher ratio than the
3.5 casualties per incident the year before. It is significant that two of these three incidents
were related to gold mining activities in the Zouar area in Tibesti region (see Box 1).
In addition to the spike in Chad, other states also witnessed a noticeable increase in
the number of casualties per incident, including Pakistan (from 2.89 in 2016 to 4.35 in
2017) or Mali (from 2.12 in 2016 to 3.10 in 2017). In other states, the average remained
at a constantly high level such as in Yemen (4.57 in 2016 and 4.67 in 2017) or Ukraine
(2.73 in 2016 and 2.39 in 2017).
TABLE 2

State/
territory

CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO IN 2017
Recorded
incidents

Number of
casualties

Average No.
casualties/
incident

Per cent of
casualties that
were civilians

Per cent of
casualties that
were killed

Pakistan

31

135

4.35

52%

37%

Ukraine

31

74

2.39

27%

26%

Mali

20

62

3.10

44%

16%

Iran

13

12

0.92

100%

25%

Chad

9

47

5.22

98%

40%

Yemen

9

42

4.67

19%

55%

Syria

9

18

2.00

89%

94%

Western Sahara

9

12

1.33

25%

0%
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The number of casualties per incident depends to a great extent on the nature of the
vehicle involved, in addition to the number of passengers. It can, for instance, be noted
that the decline in incidents with civilian vehicles in both absolute and relative terms from
2016 to 2017 (see above) contrasts with the simultaneous increase in civilian casualties
in the same period of time. Incidents with a civilian vehicle therefore led to a higher
average number of casualties: the casualty rate per incident involving a civilian vehicle
(excluding humanitarian) rose from 1.95 in 2016 to 3.07 in 2017. The corresponding rate
for overall non-civilian vehicles reached 2.92 in 2017, only slightly higher than the year
before. In 2017, national security forces suffered the highest average level of casualties
per incident (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO PER CATEGORY
OF VEHICLE IN 2017

Category
of vehicle

Recorded
incidents
involving vehicles

Number of
casualties

Average No.
casualties /
incident

Per cent of
casualties that
were killed

Civilian

70

215

3.07

40%

National security forces

41

143

3.49

24%

Peacekeeping

12

30

2.50

20%

Other combatants

8

17

2.13

29%

International security forces

6

11

1.83

18%

Humanitarian

5

9

1.80

44%

Unknown

16

47

2.94

36%

Similarly, the type of vehicle affected how deadly an incident was. The lethality rate,
understood as the ratio of killed to overall casualties, of incidents with civilian vehicles
(excluding humanitarian) in 2017 reached 40 per cent, while the rate with overall
non-civilian vehicles was 23 per cent. At the level of individual categories, incidents with
humanitarian vehicles recorded the highest lethality rate with 44 per cent (see Table 3).
These differences stem partly from the assumption that non-civilian vehicles are more
likely to be better armoured and protect passengers from the effects of explosions than
civilian vehicles.

Global trends
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BOX 2

CASE STUDY AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is considered to be one of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in
the world. Contamination is mainly due to the 10-year-long conflict that erupted
with the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union in 1979, but it is also a
result of internal armed conflict between 1992 and 1996 and the ongoing conflict
subsequent to the toppling of the Taliban in 2001.35 30,716 people were recorded as
known casualties at the end of 2017, of which close to 1,500 were due to AVMs.36
The majority of AVMs in Afghanistan are of low-metal content and were often laid
without any pattern or evident record-keeping. Of the remaining known (suspected
and confirmed) contamination of 654.1 km2 by the end of 2017, more than half of the
area relates to AVMs (including mixed minefields), especially in Kandahar, Helmand
and Farah provinces. However, new hazards from legacy AVM contamination are
constantly being discovered, with a total of 115 km2 between 2014–2017.37

FIGURE 11

DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF AVM CONTAMINATION ON AGRICULTURE
IN KANDAHAR PROVINCE

Note: Highlighted in red are suspected or confirmed hazardous areas with no demining
operations; in orange, where demining operations were ongoing as of December 2017.
© DMAC–UNMAS
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Further to its humanitarian impact, AVM contamination exerts a considerable strain
on the country’s development. 37 out of 260 planned development projects at the
end of 2017, related to road or railway infrastructure, and exploitation of natural
resources, such as copper and oil, were hindered by AVMs. 61 per cent of AVM
contamination affects agricultural production.38 This is exemplified in Figure 11,
which shows an area in Kandahar province contrasting cultivated (green) and fallow
land, the latter unexploited since it is contaminated.
In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded eight AVM incidents causing 21 casualties,
a 38 per cent decrease compared with the two previous years (34 casualties each
year). The level of AVM casualties contrasts with that for APM, ERW and so-called
pressure-plate improvised explosive device (PP-IED) casualties (see Figure 12).39
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) noted an overall
decrease of civilian casualties from most of these devices in 2017.40 This should not,
however, mask the upward trend of the preceding years.41

FIGURE 12

COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES PER DEVICE TYPE
IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2017
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According to UNAMA, improvised mines constructed as PP-IEDs in Afghanistan
“function as victim-activated devices, triggered by any person stepping on them […]
or any vehicle driving over them.” 42 In 2017, they accounted for 10 per cent of the
overall number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, especially in Helmand, Kandahar

Global trends
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and Uruzgan provinces in which hostilities continued and where devices were placed
on roads used by military forces, but equally frequented by civilians.43
The scale of PP-IEDs—and victim-operated improvised explosive devices at large—
functioning as improvised AVMs is currently insufficiently understood, both at
global level and in Afghanistan, due to a lack of institutionalised and rigorous data
disaggregation. In an initial attempt to overcome this gap, the Directorate of Mine
Action Coordination of Afghanistan used a proxy assumption whereby PP-IED
incidents with more than two casualties were considered to be more likely related
to an improvised AVM.44 This analysis presents the following estimates:

TABLE 4

ESTIMATED DISAGGREGATION OF PP-IED INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES
IN AFGHANISTAN IN 2017 45

Afghanistan

Number of
incidents

Per cent
of incidents

Number of
casualties

Per cent
of casualties

Improvised APM

385

77%

499

50%

Improvised AVM

115

23%

501

50%

500

1000

This initial exercise illustrates that the impact of improvised AVMs may exceed that of
industrially manufactured devices by several orders of magnitude. For such analysis
and discussion to be meaningful and fully based on evidence, related data collection
is required and methodological challenges addressed from the outset.

22

|

Global trends

CONCLUSION

In 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 169 incidents related, or suspected to be related,
to AVMs in 24 states and territories. This represents a slight decrease from 178 incidents
in 2015 and 181 incidents in 2016. A total of 487 casualties including 321 injured and 166
killed were recorded from these incidents, a 15 per cent increase compared with 2016.
As in previous years, civilians were the most affected category of casualties (51 per cent)
followed by national security forces (28 per cent).
From 2015 to 2017, the GICHD and SIPRI collected evidence of 528 incidents related, or
suspected to be related, to AVMs causing 1,508 casualties. Ukraine, Pakistan, Mali, Syria
and Yemen accounted for the highest numbers of casualties, representing two-thirds of
global casualties in this three-year period.
In particular, this report illustrates the relationship between casualty and lethality rates
on the one side, and casualty demographics and types of vehicles on the other. In 2017,
incidents with civilian vehicles tended to lead to a higher average of casualties than
those with non-civilian vehicles. Similarly, civilians are significantly more vulnerable to
fatalities than non-civilians.
For three consecutive years, the GICHD and SIPRI have consolidated the evidence on
the extent, geography and patterns of the direct humanitarian impact of AVMs. Various
issues deserve, however, to be scrutinised in greater depth. As illustrated by the case
study on Afghanistan in this report, the scale and impact of AVMs of an improvised
nature are presumably significant. Yet, comprehending the full magnitude of AVM impact
requires more data, consistently coded and disaggregated across contexts.
Finally, greater focus is required to increase the evidence on the nexus between
contamination from explosive ordnance at large, and from AVMs in particular, and the
cost-effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery, the return of the displaced in safety
and dignity, and the returnees’ efforts to rebuild their lives and lay the foundations for
sustainable development. This appears to be ever more relevant at a time when the
international community is working towards an effective response to the global refugee
and migration crises.
Conclusion
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ANNEX 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology
This research draws on data from states, typically national mine action authorities/
centres, as well as from mine action and other humanitarian organisations. These reports
were complemented by media reviews conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish and Urdu. Due to the high number of recorded incidents and casualties
in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, a media review in Ukrainian was added in the 2017 review.
Press articles were included, either because an incident was specially identified as
AVM-related, or because an incident corresponded to a set of criteria that strongly
indicated an AVM-related incident. These criteria included incidents such as those on
roads outside of a city involving a vehicle, but excluding remotely-detonated or suicide
bombs, and causing multiple casualties. In cases where the criteria strongly suggests
an AVM-related incident, the incident is referred to as a suspected AVM incident.
In some instances, mine action authorities and organisations were able to assess the
relevance and accuracy of retrieved press articles.
IEDs may function as improvised AVMs.46 Focusing on industrial AVMs used in a
conventional manner, this report excludes data related to AVMs of an improvised nature.
Incidents with an unknown number of casualties were categorised as incidents that
resulted in casualties, but without specifying any absolute number. For incidents referring
to a minimum number of casualties (“at least [number] casualties”), this minimum number
was retained in this research. Furthermore, unless clearly attributed in the source, the
vehicle category for incidents involving other combatants was defined as “unknown”.
The GICHD and SIPRI do not claim that the statistics presented in this report are complete
and acknowledge possible under-reporting of casualties, nor do they claim responsibility
for the accuracy and reliability of incident and media records retained for this report.
Data collection challenges
Data reported by states and organisations remain insufficient for a number of reasons.
In some instances, states with suspected AVM incidents do not release information
on mine contamination or incidents. In other cases, data remain incomplete due to
the inability of national mine action authorities or organisations to access certain areas
of the territory. This is often a challenge in conflict areas where data collection and
verification are particularly difficult. The nature of these weapons, and the fact that AVM
incidents often take place in rural areas, also make their reporting challenging, specifically
regarding the exact location of incidents.
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Reports from states and organisations generally provide much more accurate and
disaggregated information than media reports. Since the disaggregation of data is,
to a large extent, dependent on reports from states and organisations, data collection
becomes sensitive to the inactivity or closure of programmes due to a lack of funding or
due to security concerns. This may, therefore, impact the ability to access detailed data
from certain areas and to analyse trends and differences over years. The GICHD and
SIPRI are continually engaging with new stakeholders in states/territories specifically
in conflict areas, in order to ensure the most complete and long-term data collection.
Disaggregation of collected data based on the type of device is also a challenging
task. It is often difficult to identify an AVM after detonation, in particular if specific
circumstances, resources and the security situation do not allow a proper investigation
to take place. In 2017:
• 23 incidents (14 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents with

an identified or likely mine type;
• 59 incidents (35 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents with

an unknown device type;
• 87 incidents (51 per cent) were categorised as suspected AVM incidents.

Despite their higher availability than in previous years, collecting disaggregated data on
the sex and age of casualties still remains a challenge. In 2017, it was only possible to
access data disaggregated by sex in 58 per cent of casualties and by age in 43 per cent
of casualties.
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ANNEX 2: NOTES AND REFERENCES
1

In this report, AVMs are defined as landmines designed to detonate by the presence,
proximity or contact of a vehicle. It covers a wide range of vehicles that operate on land
including tanks. AVMs are also commonly known as anti-tank mines as well as mines
other than anti-personnel mines.

2

Casualties refer to individuals who were physically injured or killed.

3

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (2014), The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of
Anti-Vehicle Mines (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI).

4

GICHD–SIPRI interactive maps are available at http://www.gichd.org/avm
(Accessed: 1 March 2018).

5

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents
in 2015 (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2017), Global Mapping and
Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2016 (Geneva: GICHD and SIPRI).

6

Figures in this report are subject to rounding up/down.

7

The definition of territory rests on the United Nations definition of Non-Self-Governing
Territories. In this report, territories are italicised.

8

The 31 recorded incidents in Pakistan consist of 1 confirmed and 30 suspected AVM
incidents and strongly rely on data shared by the non-governmental organisation,
Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO). The GICHD–SIPRI
methodology tends to be more restrictive than the one used by SPADO by excluding
incidents that may more likely be related to remote-controlled improvised explosive
devices or mines of an improvised nature. Of the 31 incidents recorded in Ukraine,
8 were confirmed as AVM incidents by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OSCE SMM). A difference in methodology
between GICHD–SIPRI data collection and that of the OSCE SMM has to be noted.
According to its working methodology, the OSCE SMM corroborates every case
“by consulting [triangulating] at least three independent sources, gathering accounts from
victims and witnesses, speaking with medical workers, law enforcement officials, military
personnel, members of armed formations and other interlocutors. [...] The corroboration
process depends on the operational environment. In order to carry out its mandated
tasks, the [OSCE] SMM’s freedom of movement is critical.” Restrictions to its freedom
of movement undermine the OSCE SMM’s ability to access incident sites, hospitals and
morgues. Furthermore, “the corroboration process can take time [weeks, months] and the
Mission reviews the status of cases as information becomes available. When information
is unclear, the Mission does not record a case as confirmed until more satisfactory or
reliable information is obtained.” See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (2017), Thematic Report: Civilian casualties in
Eastern Ukraine 2016 (OSCE SMM), pp. 2-3.
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9

While the Landmine Monitor has not recorded an AVM incident in Zimbabwe
since 1999, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre has pointed to one incident in the
Chitungwiza suburb of Harare in May 2013 causing four fatalities, including one infant,
when “people brought anti tank [mines] in a bid to open them in a house [...]. This was
in the belief that they could find [...] mercury which is believed to be very expensive.”
Previously, AVM incidents occurred during the ceasefire period in the 1980s.
E-mail from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, National Coordinator, Zimbabwe Mine Action
Centre, 23 March 2018; Historical AVM data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia
were taken from the Landmine Monitor, based on an e-mail from Loren Persi, Victim
Assistance Research Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 25 February 2016.

10 In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents related, or suspected to be related,
to AVMs in 22 states and territories that caused 423 casualties (228 injured and
195 killed). The Landmine Monitor reported on 495 casualties. Due to the GICHD and
SIPRI undertaking a more focused and disaggregated data collection on AVM incidents
and due to varying methodologies, comparison with Landmine Monitor findings might
only be possible to a limited extent.
11 The GICHD and SIPRI recorded 74 and 52 casualties in Pakistan in 2015 and 2016
respectively.
12 While SPADO in Pakistan has contributed to this research since 2015, collaboration was
strengthened in 2017 via a more structured exchange of data.
13 This analysis on the years since last conflict year is based on the definition of conflict by the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The UCDP defines an armed conflict (state-based)
as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results
in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (see for instance Wallensteen Peter and
Sollenberg Margareta (2001), “Armed Conflict, 1989–2000”, Journal of Peace Research, 38(5),
pp. 629–644). In order to fill the gap that exclusively focusing on armed conflict involving
at least one government of a state might cause, non-state conflict was also considered
in the calculation. A non-state conflict is defined by the UCDP as “the use of armed force
between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state,
which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (see Sundberg Ralph,
Eck Kristine and Kreutz Joakim (2012), “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset”,
Journal of Peace Research, 49(2), pp. 351-362). For more details on definitions,
see UCDP/PRIO (2016), Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2016, available at
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.pdf (Accessed: 6 March 2018);
UCDP (2017), UCDP Non-State Conflict Codebook, Version 2-2017, available at
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-nonstate-172.pdf (Accessed: 3 April 2018).
14 While the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 598 and 423 casualties in 2015 and 2016
respectively, the Landmine Monitor recorded 459 and 495 casualties in 2015 and
2016 respectively. Between 2012 and 2014, the Landmine Monitor reported 218
AVM casualties for 2014, 212 for 2013 and 320 for 2012 (in total 750 for 2012–2014).
See International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2017), Landmine Monitor 2017, p. 58;
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2016), Landmine Monitor 2016, p. 51;
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International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2015), Landmine Monitor 2015, p. 28;
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2014), Landmine Monitor 2014, p. 35.
Note: Since 2015, the GICHD and SIPRI have shared, cross-referenced and compared
data with the Landmine Monitor. Landmine Monitor methodologies used to enter data
may differ, resulting in differences in reported annual casualties.
15 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (2017), Cambodia Mine/ERW
Victim Information System Monthly Report for December 2017, p. 5.
16 Landmine Monitor (2017a), “Chad Country Profile. Mine Action, page updated as of
11 December 2017”, http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/chad/mine-action.aspx
(Accessed: 3 April 2018).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.; Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research (2017), Tubu Trouble: State
and Statelessness in the Chad-Sudan-Libya Triangle (Geneva: SAS), p. 40.
19 Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research (2017), op. cit., pp. 40-41.
20 Some incidents might appear as one on the map, due to their geographical proximity
and the scale of the map.
21 Landmine Monitor (2017b), “Chad Country Profile. Casualties, page updated as of
13 July 2017”, http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/chad/casualties.aspx
(Accessed: 3 April 2018).
22 E-mail from Moussa Ali Soultani, Advisor at HCND, 29 March 2018.
23 E-mail from Olivier Shu, Technical Advisor Operations/Quality at HCND, 21 February 2018.
24 Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research (2017), op. cit., p. 81.
25 Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research (2017), op. cit., pp. 81-101;
Lachkar Michel, “Tchad : l’orpaillage, source de conflits dans la région du Tibesti”,
Franceinfo/Géopolis, 26 October 2017.
26 Small Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research (2017), op. cit., p. 41.
27 In this report, the term “national security forces” refers to national military, police and
border guard personnel.
28 In this report, the term “international security forces” refers to international armed forces
who are present in a conflict outside the mandate of a peacekeeping mission.
29 Excluding the category “unknown” (42 casualties), the percentages per category of
casualties would be as follows (out of 445 casualties): civilians 56%, national security
forces 31%, peacekeepers 7%, other combatants 4% and international security forces 2%.
30 In this report, the OSCE SMM is considered as a peacekeeping mission.
31 In this report, the definition of children is based on article 1 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child whereby children are considered to be persons below the age of
eighteen years. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 27531.
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32 Due to rounding up/down, percentages of this breakdown figure may exceed
100 per cent.
33 Civilian commercial vehicles are those related to business activities such as land
development or construction (e.g. bulldozer, excavator) and commercial transportation
(e.g. trucks, vehicle carrying workers).
34 Excluding the category “unknown” (16 incidents), the percentages per category of
vehicles would be as follows (out of 142 incidents): civilian 49%, national security forces
29%, peacekeeping 9%, other combatants 6%, international security forces 4% and
humanitarian 4%.
35 Landmine Monitor (2017c), “Afghanistan Country Profile. Mine Action, page updated as of
11 December 2017”, http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/afghanistan/mine-action.aspx
(Accessed: 3 April 2018).
36 Landmine Monitor (2017d), “Afghanistan Country Profile. Casualties, page updated as of
13 July 2017”, http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/afghanistan/casualties.aspx
(Accessed: 3 April 2018); Abdul Qudous Ziaee (2017), The Challenge of AV mines in Afghanistan
(Presentation at the ICRC-ISIL Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, New Delhi, India, 6 December 2017); e-mail from Abdul Qudous Ziaee,
Operations Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan, 18 March 2018.
37 Abdul Qudous Ziaee (2017), op. cit.; e-mail from Abdul Qudous Ziaee, Operations Manager,
UNMAS Afghanistan, 18 March 2018.
38 22% of remaining known AVM contamination has an impact on road construction, 13% on
housing, 2% on water, 1% on other infrastructure (e.g. bridges) and 1% on historical
heritage sites. See Abdul Qudous Ziaee (2017), op. cit.
39 Data retrieved from the Information Management System for Mine Action in Afghanistan.
E-mail from Abdul Qudous Ziaee, Operations Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan,
18 March 2018.
40 In 2017, UNAMA documented 639 civilian casualties from ERW and 1,019 civilian
casualties from PP-IEDs compared with 725 civilian casualties from ERW and 1,102 civilian
casualties from PP-IEDs in 2016. It is also worth noting that in 2016, the Directorate
of Mine Action Coordination of Afghanistan recorded 120 casualties from APMs
(against 51 in 2017), 1,195 from PP-IEDs (against 1,000 in 2017) and 604 from ERWs
(against 964 in 2017). See United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2018), Afghanistan. Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict. Annual Report 2017, pp. 16 and 31; e-mail from Abdul Qudous Ziaee,
Operations Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan, 18 March 2018; e-mail from Abdul Qudous
Ziaee, Operations Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan, 26 March 2018.
41 Landmine Monitor (2017d), op. cit.
42 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (2017), Afghanistan. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
Annual Report 2016, p. 14.
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43 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (2018), op. cit., pp. 31-32.
44 Certain difficulty in considering and disaggregating improvised mines, activated by the
presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle, stems from the fact that their exact trigger
weight is not necessarily known, varies or might not be determined after an explosion.
A low-pressure threshold might be indicative of a device designed to be (also) triggered
by the presence, proximity or contact of a person.
45 E-mail from Abdul Qudous Ziaee, Operations Manager, UNMAS Afghanistan,
7 February 2018.
46 There is no universally accepted definition of an IED. However, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization for instance defines an IED as “a device placed or fabricated in an
improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary
chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate
military stores but is normally devised from non-military components.”
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010), Glossary of Terms and Definitions,
NATO document AAP-6(2010), p. 2-I-2.
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